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TWO CHALLENGES FOR FEMINIST
THOUGHT
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
Feminist theory comes in all varieties and shapes. Consider for
example the differences that are observed between cultural and
radical feminists. In the former ranks, it is possible to find re-
peated emphasis on the differences in observed psychology be-
tween men and women. Women speak, as Carol Gilligan's has
claimed, "in a different voice" from men because they are more
committed to the preservation and transmission of life, while
men are more concerned with individual transcendence or social
control.' Other cultural feminists are willing to acknowledge
some role for biological influences in the creation and mainte-
nance of social roles and legal order,' while still others claim that
law may be an "irretrievably male" discipline because its stress on
the separate identities of different human beings is more consis-
tent with male temperament than with female temperament.' In
sharp distinction radical feminists, such as Catharine McKinnon4
and Andrea Dworkin5 believe that all acts of sexual intercourse
are best understood as assaultive attacks on women, and others
have followed with the claim that pregnancy too should be
treated in the same fashion.6
These differences in basic orientation carry over into the
choice of political solutions that are sought. Some feminists stress
the differences between the sexes and demand that some form of
accommodation be made, whether in the larger political or con-
stitutional order,' or in the workplace to reflect these differ-
ences.8 Yet some feminists, like Sylvia Law, are far more
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago.
1. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 2, 105 (1985); see also Marilyn French, Be-
yond Power 482-83 (1985).
2. NFL NODDINGS, CARING 128 (1984).
3. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, U. Ci. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1988).
4. CATHERimN A. MACKnNON, TOWARD A FEMmNisT THEORY OF THE STATE 3-4 (1989).
5. ANDREA DwomIaN, IN"ERcoUtrsE 21-22 (1987).
6. SHUI.AMrrHi FriEsroNE, THE Dsuacrrc OF SEx 233-34 (1970).
7. See, ag., Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE UJ. 447,480-508 (1984);
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REv. 543, 543-44 (1986).
8. Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theoiy: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 CoLum. L. Ray. 1118, 1139-40 (1986).
HeinOnline  -- 18 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 331 1994-1995
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Polity
suspicious of the ostensibly benign accommodations that other
feminists demand. She believes that an emphasis on the biologi-
cal differences will obscure the important socially created distinc-
tions of perhaps even greater importance, nonetheless, she shows
some clear attachment to the traditional beliefs in individual au-
tonomy.9 Still other feminists, like Ruth Bader Ginsburg, opt
strongly for sex-blind rules on both moral and constitutional
grounds.10
The richness and diversity of feminist thought is, I think, a sign
of its vitality. Any long and complete study of the different
branches (strands understates the volume of the work) of femi-
nist thought would require a detailed study not possible in a
short essay. On this occasion, however, I shall not focus on dis-
putes within the ranks of feminist thought. Rather, I take as my
self-assigned task the obligation to raise some common chal-
lenges to all versions of feminist theory-challenges that they
must meet if they are going to not only speak to those within the
movement, but also to persuade those of us beyond the fold that
feminism can contribute, as all useful theories must, to the un-
derstanding of human nature and social relations.
In order to raise these challenges, I shall focus on two broad
classes of issues-one positive and the other normative-that
should be of concern to all theorists, whether or not they fall
within the feminist camp. The first and descriptive question con-
cerns the issue of sex differences, their origins and their extent.
Are these to be understood solely in cultural and social terms, or
is there some irreducible biological component to behavior that
helps shape the common forms of human interactions? The sec-
ond and normative question addresses the linkage between our
understanding of the nature of men and women, both in the sin-
gular and the plural, and our substantive beliefs about the cor-
rect choice of political philosophy and political institutions.
Should one be some kind of libertarian at one extreme or some
kind of socialist at the other? Or somewhere in between?
9. See, e.g. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 969
(1984). "The vision of equality advocated here suggests that the appropriate function of
the law is not to enforce a general vision of what men and women are really like, but
rather to respect each person's authority to define herself or himself, free from sex-de-
fined legal constraints.").
10. See, e.g. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equalfty and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 14
WOMEN'S Rrs. L RE'. 361, 366 (1992). For judicial decisions, in which she successfully
argued for her constitutional vision, see, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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This progression uses knowledge of the human condition,
drawn largely from collateral disciplines outside the law, as the
background for the more normative discussions that follow.
Classical political philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke fol-
lowed this very progression, beginning with individual psychol-
ogy and moving outward to political organization." While the
terms of the debate have shifted in modem times, the more am-
bitious feminist thinkers must undertake this same comprehen-
sive program.
I. THE BIOLOGY OF SEX SIMI.AREs AND DIFFERENCES
The first question concerns the role of biology in understand-
ing human relation. Most feminists rarely make any effort to rely
on sociobiology for their descriptive work, even if they do criti-
cize that mode of thought from time to time. 2 In this regard,
there is a strong temptation to view any observed differences be-
tween males and females not as natural differences, but as "social
constructs," without stopping to ask exactly who has done the
constructing and what that person or group hopes to achieve.
Feminism should confront much more explicitly the biological
constraints on human behavior. Many distinguished biologists
consider these constraints to be quite strong.s These constraints
long antedate the arrival of human beings on the scene and man-
ifest themselves whenever sex differences appear. Certainly these
differences appear in striking fashion among the various pri-
mates that are not capable of reflective and conscious reorganiza-
11. See generally, THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1651);JoHN LocKE, AN ESSAy CONCERNING HuMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H.
Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1690);JOHN LocxE, THE SECoND TREArISE OF CIVIL
GovERNmMENT (1690), reprinted in THE TRADITION OF FR.tEOM: SE.ECrIONS FROM THE WRIT-
Rs WHO SiiAPED TRADITONAL CONCEPTs OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE IN AmERICA 1 (Milton S.
Mayer ed., Oceana Publications 1957) [hereinafter LocKE, SECOND TRATAsE].
12. See, e.g., Henna H. Kay, Perspectives on Sociobiology, Feminism, and the Law, in THEo-
RETIcAr. PERSPECrrVEs ON SEXuAL DIFFERENcE 74, 75 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) (stat-
ing that "sociobiologists use sexual difference as a natural evolutionary justification for
continued female exploitation"); Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People,
Sociobiolog-Another Biological Determinism, in THE SOcIOBIOLOGY DEBATE 280, 289-90 (Ar-
thur L. Caplan ed., 1978) (arguing that ethnography, archaeology, and history all demon-
strate that biology does not limit human social organization or the roles of the sexes
within a society).
13. See, e.g., RicHARD DAwKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 152-76 (1976) (arguing that biology
determines behavior); EDDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HuMAN NATURE 33, 133-34 (1979) (same).
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tion of their social life.' 4 Why then should they be absent in
human beings?
Recall that the basic sociobiological theory postulates that the
dominant drive is one of fitness for the individual, which is mani-
fested by the extent to which he (or she) is able to pass on copies
of his (or her) genes to the next generation. 5 Stating the propo-
sition thusly makes it clear that individuals are not interested in
their own individual well-being in some narrow egotistical sense.
Such a short-sighted view cuts off any chance of evolutionary suc-
cess before it begins. Instead, the idea of individual self-interest is
meant to exclude only the idea that the individual acts for the
benefit of a stranger, that is, an organism that has no, or only
slight, genetic connection with that individual. But once the pass-
ing on of genes becomes the goal, then the well-being of off-
spring becomes essential for any biological creature, regardless
of culture or circumstance. This goal, moreover, is identical for
both males and females, but the strategies that they adopt to
achieve it will differ because of their dissimilar biological endow-
ments. There are thus both similarities and differences between
males and females and the biological theory seeks to account for
both.
It is useful to review the basic calculation that is captured in
the idea of inclusive fitness. The principle states that each organ-
ism, including each human being, takes into account not only its
own well-being, but also the well-being of offspring and kin, dis-
counted by the want of any common relationship. 6 Thus, your
children count "one-half of you." Therefore, in calculating the
return to individual actions, their benefit counts one-half your
own benefit; nieces and nephews (as children of siblings) count a
quarter, and so on down the line. The basic task is to figure out
how people investing their own private resources can generate
an array of benefits not only for themselves, but also for persons
with whom they have a genetic affinity. They are generous to the
extent that they wish to benefit some limited class of others, but
14. See DANIEL G. FREEDMAN, HUMAN SOCIOBioLOGY 27-43 (1979) (discussing sex-based
roles in primate societies).
15. See DAVID P. BARASH, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 23 (1982); DAWKINS, supra note
7; EDWARD 0. WILSON, SocioOLow" 156 (1980).
16. BARASH, supra note 9, at 43, 71-73;JERoME H. BARROW, DARWIN, SEX, AND STATUS 50-
53 (1989); W.D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution ofSocial Behaviour. 1, 7J. THEORETICAL
BIOLOGY 1 (1964).
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egotistical to the extent that they rate gains to themselves as
higher than gains to the objects of their benevolence.
A simple example might help. If a particular action costs a per-
son 100 and provides benefits of 250, he will take it whether the
benefits go to himself or to his offspring, for he rates 125 (as half
of 250) greater than the cost of 100. And by implication, he will
take that action (lacking some better choice) no matter how the
250 units of benefit are distributed between himself and his off-
spring. Yet, if the benefits of this action are only 150, then the
question of who benefits, and in what proportions, becomes cru-
cial. The actor will not take the action if all benefits go to an
offspring but will take it if at least one-third of the benefits go to
himself. (Fifty plus one-half of 100 equals 100.) But he will not
take that action if the benefits to himself fall below one-third.
The same calculations work if "she" is substituted for "he" in all
of the above calculations. So the similarities are there, and they
are profound.
Nonetheless, this same theory explains why the differences in
behavior between males and females are as fundamental and en-
during as the differences between sperm and eggs. The basic im-
plication is that different strategies for the investment in
offspring will be adopted by males and females. On the one
hand, any male can generate sperm by the billions, and of neces-
sity the mature male has a very small investment in each sperm.
The easy replication of sperm means it is possible to father many
offspring simultaneously, so long as the mothers will provide care
and nourishment during pregnancy and thereafter. The female
strategy for investment differs because they have few eggs, and, in
humans, can carry only one, or perhaps two, to maturity at any
given time. They must invest very large resources in a single off-
spring. The key point is that asymmetries in behavior-sexual di-
morphisms, as they are called in the trade' 7-are attributable to
this universal sex difference, not only in human beings, but in all
species that operate on this same basic pattern of sexual division.
Working through the theory shows that both males and fe-
males, if driven by the same level of self-interest, adopt different
patterns of behavior to reflect their different biological endow-
ments. One implication is that males are far more likely to en-
17. See generally BARASH, supra note 9, at 195, 228-31 & fig. 10.16 (discussing the effects
of sexual dimorphisms on behavior);JoHN GmaBN & MARY GRIBBiN, THE ONE PER CENT
AVANTAGE 147-48 (1988) (same).
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gage in rivalrous behavior than females, for the insemination of
multiple females would substantially increase the number of one
male's offspring. 18 Yet, for any one male to succeed, others have
to be precluded. So success involves choosing high risk/high re-
turn strategies. Females have a lesser incentive to engage in such
rivalrous behavior because the returns to fitness are far lower.
For a female, the number of offspring is sharply limited by her
carrying capacity. Mating with many males produces little addi-
tional gain, especially after fertilization takes place,' 9 and may
well produce some substantial loss, such as the substitution of an
inferior male as father.
This difference in sexual strategies has strong behavioral impli-
cations in courtship. Males will take the initiative because they
have less to lose. Females will play hard-to-get in order to have
the male demonstrate some level of loyalty, which could prove
critical in assisting the mother during pregnancy and helping
with the offspring thereafter. Yet, once the offspring is con-
ceived, the mother's tendency will be to try and keep the father
loyal, and the father's tendency will be to wander. These instincts
carry over into humans and shape the asymmetrical courtship
patterns that tend to be observed whenever individuals are al-
lowed to choose their own mates in the marriage market. It is the
male who tends to take the initiative at the outset of the relation-
ship and the female who has to decide whether to accept or re-
ject. And since the behavior is so important to the role, we
should expect that the psychology will be molded to follow self-
interest: men and women are more comfortable in playing the
roles that are congenial to their biological roles, and will find
themselves uneasy with powerful social conventions that dictate a
parity in social roles in courtship, marriage and parenting.
In addition to behavioral patterns, basic biological characteris-
tics will be influenced as well. Consider the onset of puberty at
different ages for males and females. Sociobiology supplies an
explanation. The female's objective is to maximize her opportu-
nities to carry offspring to term, and an early start is a good idea
as long as the mother's health is not impaired by the burdens of
18. BARKow, supra note 10, at 57-61; FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 67-72; Robert L.
Trivers, Paternal Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELECION AND THE DESCENT OF
MAN, 1871-1971, at 136, 139-41 (Bernard Campbell ed., 1972).
19. BARKow, supra note 10, at 57-61.
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pregnancy.2 ° But for males, early puberty could lead to a sexual
attraction that in turn leads into conflict with other males who
are larger and better able to win out in direct conflict.21 So a
delayed puberty keeps the young male out of harm's way until he
is strong enough to have good chances at reproductive success.22
These differences only operate at the margins, but they are im-
portant nonetheless. I know of no purely social theory that would
explain this commonplace difference between the sexes, which
in turn would help explain other practices that are equally com-
monplace, such as the general tendency for men to marry wo-
men who are younger than they are.2 3
The implications of the theory carry over into areas on which
many feminists like to dwell. To give but one illustration, it is
sometimes said in feminist theory that men are much more con-
cerned with rights, and women are much more concerned with
caring.24 Based upon biology, there is some degree of truth in
this notion, because in most instances, the female has the greater
opportunity to influence the condition of the offspring for the
better. If her costs are lower with respect to protection, we would
expect that she would offer greater protection than a male who
has a similar investment in the same offspring. Here the basic
framework set out above continues to hold for both sexes. The
key difference is that the lower cost of care suggests that, at the
margin, the female will be able and willing to devote more of her
own limited resources to the welfare of her children before she
reaches that critical two-to-one ratio. And if the female devotes
more time in dealing with offspring, then she will spend less time
in dealing with strangers, that is, in dealing in transactions at
arm's length, for which the vocabulary of rights is designed. The
usual differences in sex roles should not be overstated, but by the
same token they should not be ignored.
These behavioral differences, moreover, do not take place in a
void. They clearly rest on a very complex web of interactions be-
tween human beings that depend on cues that are hard to iden-
tify in the abstract, but influence all sorts of prosaic human
20. BMARsH, supra note 9, at 231; David M. Buss,Sex Differences in Human Mate Selection
Criteria: An Evolutionayy Perspective, in SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PsYcuOLoGy 335, 348-50 (Charles
Crawford et al. eds., 1987).
21. BARASH, supra note 9, at 231.
22. Id.
23. See U.N. DRP'T OF INT'L ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, PATrERNS OF Fmsr MARRIAGE
at 7-12, 17-18, 22-31, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.R/111 (1990).
24. See, e.g., GiLua, A, supra note 1, at 17, 73, 100.
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interactions. We now know that the actions of some hormones
and neurotransmitters differ sharply between the sexes, and that
these substances influence all kinds of behavior, often in power-
ful and dramatic ways.25 It is one thing to argue their irrelevance
as a matter of normative theory, but quite a different thing to
postulate their irrelevance as a matter of descriptive theory.
These silent chemicals are part of our biological endowments
and we cannot act and speak as though they have no influence
over social behavior, when clearly at some level they do.
The differences between men and women, then, are not sim-
ply matters of size, or even matters of size and strength-
although these should never be ignored in any overview of the
basics. They are also matters of psychology and behavior. The
differences are not polar in any category. It would be foolish to
say that all men are categorically different from all women. But
by the same token, it would be irresponsible to claim that the
shape of the distribution with respect to certain traits, its median,
and its variance is the same for both males and females when it
seems so clear that they are not.Y6 The evidence on these matters
seems to be accumulating, even to the point where it is said that
women and men tend to give directions in different ways-wo-
men use landmarks, men use coordinates 27-or interact with
computers in fundamentally different ways-women as tools that
25. SeeMitch Berman etal., The Effects of Hormones, Type A Behavior Pattern, and Provoca-
tion on Aggression in Men, 17 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 125, 135-37 (1993) (finding that
males with higher endogenous testosterone levels displayed more aggressive behavior);
Anke W. Ehrhardt & Susan W. Baker, Fetal Androgens, Human Central Nervous System Differ-
entiation, and Behavior Sex Differences, in SEx DiFFERENcES IN BaHAVIOR 33, 47-50 (Richard
C. Friedman et al. eds., 1974) (concluding that females with greater-than-average prena-
tal production of male sex hormone were more likely to display long-term tomboy behav-
ior); Jeanette McGlove, Sex Differences in Human Brain Asymmetry: A Critical Survey, in THa
PsYcHLoxGY OF GEmDa 281 (Carol N.Jacklin ed., 1992) (finding that studies support the
conclusion that the male brain is more symmetrically organized for both verbal and non-
verbal functions); Anne C. Petersen, Physical Androgyny and Cognitive Functioning in Adoles-
cance, 12 DEv. PSYCHOL. 524, 529-31 (1976) (concluding that males with lower levels of
male hormones and females with higher levels of male hormones had greater spatial
visualization abilities). See generally PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH, VOLUa 61: Sax DiR=-
.iNcs IN THEa BRAIN (G.J. de Vries et al. eds., 1984) (listing a collection of studies).
26. See, e.g.,Janet S. Hyde, How Large are GenderDifferences in Aggression? A Developmental
Meta-Analysis, in THE PsYCHOLOGy OF GENDER, supra note 19, at 265, 273-75 (finding that,
while aggression differences are fairly reliable across studies, they are not large);Just How
the Sexes Differ, NawswEaa, May 18, 1991, at 72, 83 (noting that average differences within
a sex exceeds average differences between sexes); see also HnAt M. LUo, SEX & GaNDER
105-21, 131-49 (1993) (providing a survey of the studies to date); ROaRT E. POOL, EVE'S
Rm (1994) (same).
27. Diane McGuinness &Janet Sparks, Sex Differences in Representations of a Familiar Ter-
rain, 7(2) J. M AL IMAGERY 91, 99-100 (1983).
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should work, men as objects of play.2 8 Perhaps some bits of this
information are overstated for dramatic effect, but as the evi-
dence accumulates, it all seems to run in the same direction.
There are important and enduring differences in the behavior
and psychology of males and females that must be understood
before they are either praised or blamed. Our task is to see how
the sociobiology can be added to the tool kit used to evaluate
and understand human conduct.
II. NORMATVE IMPLICATIONS
The accumulation of biological information about males and
females has important normative implications for the study of
human behavior and human institutions. But in order to see
these connections, we must proceed with some care. One fallacy
that must be avoided is the assertion that there must be some
necessary connection between the natural and the good. There is
no such necessary connection. There are all sorts of instincts for
which people have strong biological instincts: there are people
who like to beat up their rivals, to lie, and to cheat.29 Indeed, it is
precisely because these instincts are so natural and inbred that
they are so hard to eradicate. Our evolutionary inheritance is
what we have for better or for ill, but no one could say that it
ideally equips us for life within the social setting.
The question still remains, however, as to what framework will
tell us which types of natural instincts should be honored, and
which should be suppressed. My own view is that the question
should be answered by looking to see what forms of human be-
havior advance overall social welfare. In that inquiry, the distinc-
tion between force and fraud on the one hand, and voluntary
contract on the other must play a central role. The former result
in negative sum games in which the winnings to one side are
smaller than the losses to the other. The more those games are
played the greater the total losses, and the more likely that each
individual will lose on net to the depredations of others. It is for
that reason that the classical social contract theory stressed the
28. Marlaine E. Lockheed, Women, Girls, and Computers: A Fst Look at the Eviden 13
SEx ROLES 115, 118-21 (1985).
29. See Charles F. Bond & Michael Robinson, TheEvolution ofDeception, 12J. NoNVERBAL
BEHAV. 295, 301.05 (1988) (discussing the hereditary component of human deceptive-
ness); Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Evolution of Destrucive Behavior, 3 AGRFsSrvE BE HAv. 127,
135 (1977) (noting that observations of children born deaf and blind found patterns of
aggressive behavior despite lack of opportunity to observe such behavior).
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mutual renunciation of force as a key to ordered liberty in soci-
ety. 0 And for whatever it is worth, the power of this prohibition
surely hits harder on men than it does on women, given their
differences in natural strength and aggression. Yet it is fully justi-
fied given the overall gains it generates, for men as well as wo-
men, even if not in perfectly even proportions.
Yet if force and fraud are dangerous to aggregate human well-
being, then voluntary arrangements, including those in marriage
and within the family, have the exact opposite consequence.
They increase the welfare of all the parties to them, for people
enter into agreements only when they gain more than they lose.
To be sure, one has to be careful that force and fraud do not
contaminate these agreements. Yet by the same token, we cannot
interpret a powerful need for entering into a contractual ar-
rangement as evidence that a contract was procured by force or
fraud. There are genuine human needs, born of scarcity, on both
sides of any transaction. Society must police the category of vol-
untary interactions, but by the same token these interactions
should be fostered by the laws that secure their enforcement
even in the face of ex post reluctance or regret. The more volun-
tary interactions we have, the more likely it is that their benefits
will be widely distributed across all individuals, again within mar-
riage and family.
The basic biological theory is important in this connection be-
cause it gives some broad and useful clues as to the direction
these interactions will take. All too often it is assumed that the
only just set of interactions are those which have men and wo-
men in positions of parity and identity throughout society.3s The
elimination or the suppression of sex roles is regarded as an ob-
jective of the sound society, and the evident differences in sex
roles in virtually all societies, including our own, is treated as a
sign that something is very much amiss. But if the descriptive
truths about male/female differences hold, then we should not
respond to the specialization of sex roles with a suspicion that
often rises to the level of bitter denunciation. If individuals do
have different natural endowments, then the system of voluntary
arrangement should reflect those differences. The specialization
30. SeeLoc, SECOND TREATISE; supra note 5, at 4-7, 27-29;JEANJACQUES RouSSEAu, ON
THE SOCIAL CoNrraAcr 48-49, 52-54 (Roger D. Masters ed. & Judith R. Masters trans., St.
Martin's Press 1978) (1762).
31. Se&, e.g., MACKINNON, THEORY OF STATE, supra note 2. at 242-49 (arguing that any
difference in position is due to male domination).
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allows an increase in gains within family and marriage that can
be shared by both parties. It should be a source of social satisfac-
tion, not the object of social denunciation.
It is in this connection that I find the broad scale feminist de-
nunciation of existing patterns of male/female interactions so
puzzling. But denunciations there often are. One of the constant
charges made is that these interactions are wholly arbitrary and
conventional.32 A second charge is in tension with the first: far
from being just arbitrary and conventional, male/female interac-
tions are the product of domination, exploitation and subordina-
tion. 3 I think that both of these charges are overblown, and
largely false. Let me address each of them briefly.
One way to address the question of whether the social arrange-
ments within the family are arbitrary and conventional is to ask
what would happen if they were organized otherwise. In order to
do that, it is useful to imagine a situation in which a mother, the
moment after childbirth, took up her hunting implements and
sallied forth into the woods, leaving the newborn infant in the
care of its father.34 Now compare the success of this society with
one which followed the more conventional arrangements
whereby the mother stayed close to the child and the father went
out on the hunting expedition. There is little question that the
first society would find itself pressed against the hard edge of sur-
vival: the mother would be less good, and fit, for her task, and so
too the father. The output that they could generate would be far
less than under the conventional arrangement, which in my view
is far from arbitrary. It works to the mutual advantage and ulti-
mate survival of all members of the family. It is far from a simple
historical curiosity that no early society reversed the sex roles and
organized itself in ways that gave men the dominant responsibil-
ity for child rearing and women the dominant responsibility for
hunting and defense. The price of these social experiments
would be too high in an age where every calorie of energy had to
32. See Martha Fineman, Feminist Theory and Law, 18 HAsv.J.L. & PuB. PoL 349 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEmImsM UNMODrFIE 32, 32-45 (1987) (arguing that dominance over women was
achieved by force and perpetuated by construction of social perception); Ruth Colker,
Anti-Subordination Above Al Se, Race, andEqual Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1007-16,
1063-66 (1986) (rejecting policies, even if facially neutral, that perpetuate historical sub-
ordination of women).
. 34. Staying in the fields with the child may be grueling work, but it avoids the separa-
tion that the hunting example suggests.
No. 2]
HeinOnline  -- 18 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 341 1994-1995
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Polic [
be preserved. The result would be death by exhaustion or
extermination.
It is therefore of especial irony to note that it is only with mod-
em technology that we find it possible to relax the traditional sex
roles within the family. The very sharp degrees of specialization
that were necessary for survival in primitive cultures are no
longer matters of life and death today. The expansion of the re-
source base makes it possible to use machinery for much of the
drudge work at home and to allow women, if they so choose, to
enter the workplace. But even though the patterns of child rear-
ing have changed, as well they might, we should not forget the
powerful biological influences on men and women. Husbands
and wives, by and large, still assume differential roles with respect
to parenting even though these are not the same roles that one
found in the Stone Age.35 Women are more likely to want to take
a break in their careers than men, even if it means that some
long term prospects for professional advancement are dimmed. 6
But there is little reason here for social concern, for it allows fam-
ily arrangements to adapt to changes in technology and educa-
tion for the benefit of men and women alike.
If this analysis is correct, then not only is it wrong to speak of
dominant social arrangements as arbitrary and conventional, but
it is equally wrong to speak of these arrangements as though they
are solely the product of domination, exploitation, and subordi-
nation.37 We do not have to hew faithfully to the image of the
husband as the "good provider" and the wife as the "good home-
maker" in order to see how these relations have evolved over
time. It is enough to indicate that the specialization of roles
within marriage that allow both husbands and wives to use their
talents to the fullest should not be regarded as an exploitive ar-
rangement. In particular, if the division of labor within marriage
35. SeeJean W. Atkinson & Ted L. Huston, Sex Role Orientation and Division of Labor in
Early Marriage, 46J. PmtsoN=Y AD Soc. PsYcHoz. 330, 341-44 (1984) (noting that the
shift of women into the work force has not been accompanied by a similar increase in
men's performance of traditional female tasks at home); Michele Hoffnung, Motherhood.
Contemporary Conflict for Women, in WOMEN 157, 162-65 (Jo Freedman ed., 1989) (noting
that, even when both spouses work, women perform a substantially greater amount of
childrearing activities); John P. Robinson et al., Sex-Role Differences in Time Use 3 SEx
RoLEs 443, 456-57 (1977) (concluding that women continue to perform greater amounts
of traditional female tasks at home partly due to reluctance to give up this area of
control).
36. Jennie Farley, Worklsfe Problemfor Both Women and Men, in SExuAL.x IN ORC.ANIZA-
-XoNs 29, 30-33 (Dail A. Neugarten &Jay M. Shafritz eds., 1980).
37. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 27, at 32-45; Colker, supra note 27.
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expands the total amount of a couple's production, then so
much the better. An insistence on identity of roles and tasks
within marriage would require each party to do tasks that the
other can do better, and to eliminate the gains that come from
specialization of task and function. We should not accept without
a great deal of proof any world view that regards any voluntary
transactions between the sexes as at best a zero sum game in
which women at best lose no more than men gain. That amounts
to a very grim view of human arrangements, for we could rarely,
if ever, obtain a Kaldor-Hicks world in which the gains to the
winners (men) are greater than the losses to the losers (women).
We certainly would remain far from a Pareto-optimal world in
which both sides to the transaction are better off.88
The biological postulates about self-interest yield, for once, far
more upbeat conclusions: contracts and social arrangements that
take place between men and women have the same desirable
consequences as contracts between men and men or women and
women. From the ex ante perspective, both sides to the deal are
better off. Of course, some transactions will turn out sour as con-
ditions and desires change, but this is hardly a reason to ban pri-
vate agreements any more than we should cease all forms of
regulation because some of them misfire on occasion. The focal
point of the discussion has to be on the anticipated effects, which
turn out to be the actual effects on most occasions. On this score,
the implications of this mutual gain model are quite different
from those of the exploitation model which too many feminists
champion.
One testing ground for this theory deals with the distribution
of gains and losses inside marriage. On this question, I think that
the best article in recent years is a 1987 paper by Lloyd Cohen.
Its title is, "Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or 'I Gave Him
the Best Years of My Life.' ,9 The title is designed first to
deaden, and then to stimulate, all your romantic interest in the
subject. Cohen's task in this paper is, however, a serious one. He
begins with the obvious point that during courtship there is lots
of room to choose an available mate, so that there is a competi-
tive market of sorts in which couples then pair off. But once the
marriage is made, and then goes sour, divorce takes place under
38. See Gary Lawson, Feminist Lgal Theories, 18 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL 325 (1994).
39. Lloyd Cohen, Mariage, Divore and Quasi Rents; or "I Gave Him the Best Years of My
Life' 16J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987).
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radically different market conditions, namely, bilateral monop-
oly: the wife may only divorce her husband, and vice versa.40 The
terms and conditions under which the divorce takes place are
highly influenced by the legal rules of the game. If the consent of
both parties is needed, then one side can hold out for a lion's
share of the game. If divorce is granted on the application of one
party over the objection of the other, then the critical question
concerns rules that shape the division of marital assets.
In choosing the ideal rules, the feminist critics are often cor-
rect when they note that husbands are in a position to exploit
their wives unless legal protection is given. But the critics should
not forget that much of that difference stems from the different
biological clocks for men and women. A woman's contributions
to a marriage are often greatest in its earliest years, when her
reproductive capacities are at their highest. In the traditional
marriage, moreover, she spent a good deal of her time and effort
working at home and on the job so that her husband could ob-
tain professional training that translates into a higher income for
the couple.4" To allow the husband simply to walk away from the
marriage allows him to convert his wife's labor to his own advan-
tage without compensating her for what she has sacrificed by
contributing to his future earnings potential and well-being.
In light of these behavior patterns, the risk of exploitation is
present in marital arrangements, even under the fairly rigorous
definition used in law and economics, which equates risk of ex-
ploitation with the ability to exploit a monopoly position under
the applicable legal rules.42 Here the exploitation can come in
two forms. First, the husband can extract most of the gains from
the marriage, even if the wife is better off than she would have
been if the marriage had never taken place. Second, it may well
be that the conversion of the wife's labor upon divorce leaves her
worse off than she would have been if she had not married him
in the first place. The general lesson from this analysis is that
using standard conceptions of law and economics does not nec-
essarily protect what might be called the "male" point of view,
and suggests that upon divorce the wife should have some sort of
claim that represents her investment in his future human capital.
40. Id. at 299-303.
41. Id. at 284-95. See also GARiv S. BEC , A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 119 (enlarged ed.,
1991) (giving reasons for earlier marriage of females).
42. RicHARD A. PosNER, ANrrrusr LAw 8-18 (1976).
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Divorce is, of course, an exceptional transaction, far removed
from the usual market transactions of borrowing money, getting
jobs, and buying houses. The harder question for many feminists
is what legal position they should adopt if the complexities of the
bilateral monopoly do not have to be negotiated in a particular
case. If one is correct about the basic self-interest assumptions
that spring from the social biology, the pointed question is why
are not all feminists libertarians, as the older, nearly quaint
phrase, "women's liberation," suggests. At one time, there was a
strong connection between feminism and libertarian thought.
John Stuart Mill was an ardent supporter of women's causes in
the nineteenth century, and it is no accident that he was also the
author of On Liberty, in which he took the sensible position that
the only warrant for the use of state power was to prevent the
harm that one individual could cause to another.4'
Here it is sufficient to note that the early feminist efforts were
all concerned with claims for full civil capacity-the right to vote,
to enter contracts, to hold property on the same terms and con-
ditions as men. The early feminist efforts to win the vote for wo-
men certainly fall within the aspirations for equal citizenship that
all libertarians share,' but they speak to a very different goal
than one which insists that women be represented in popular
assemblies in proportion to their numbers. Likewise, the demand
for full equality with men in the ability to make contracts, enter
professions, and hold property goes to the very heart of the liber-
tarian program. And the power of these ideals is well shown by
43. I like the passage so much that I shall quote it in full, and ignore some of the
difficulties in its application:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do
so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so
would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for
compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTmrrAmi m, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATWE GOVERNMENT
85, 95-96 (Everyman's Library ed. 1951) (1st ed. 1863).
On Mill's feminist sympathies generally, see JOHN STUART MILL & HARIr TAYLOR
MILL, ESSAYS ON Sax EQuAmrr (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970);John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of
Women, in THREE EssAYS 427 (The World's Classics ed. 1966) (London, The World's Clas-
sics ed. 1912).
44. See ganeraly SravN M. BuacHLEu, WoMEN'S MovEMENTS IN THE UNrrED STATES 89-
106 (1990) (providing a detailed history of the women's suffiage movement).
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the number of times that feminists quote from the Supreme
Court's now infamous decision in Bradwell v. I//inois,4 5 sustaining
Illinois law that prohibited women from entering the practice of
law. This decision rested heavily on the biological differences be-
tween the sexes. Yet, what is critical about that decision is that it
places formal restrictions against the capacity to enter into cer-
tain professions, and was justified on the same grounds that lim-
ited the freedom of women to contract during marriage. It is the
antithesis of a libertarian position, and it should be rejected even
by those who think that the biological differences between the
sexes do make a difference in their occupational preferences-
there is no reason to foreordain that result, for, if the differences
do matter, then they will be reflected by the patterns of employ-
ment that emerge once the legal barriers to entry are struck
down.
The battles of this century, and the next, are far removed from
the issue decided in BradwelJ Today, legal rules are likely to mis-
fire in quite a different fashion. We are far more likely to make
an error that is the mirror image of that in Bradwell namely, to
perceive any differences in the practice patterns or income of
men and women lawyers or other professionals as evidence of
sexism and patriarchy. What is needed from feminists is an insis-
tence on universal liberty, not some narrow or particularistic ad-
vantage to women (or at least some women) regardless of its
overall consequences to society. What is needed is a willingness
to expand opportunities for all individuals, not some blind insis-
tence on identity in outcomes in the marketplace for men and
45. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872). The strongest language reads as follows:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference
in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of woman-
hood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong or
should belong to the family institution, is repugnant to the idea of a women
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. So firmly
fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a
maxim of that system ofjurisprudence that a woman has no legal existence sepa-
rate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the
social state.... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And
the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things,
and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.
Md. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment).
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for women. We need to rekindle our awareness of the great dan-
gers of government coercion, and, armed with that knowledge,
limit the causes for which we are prepared to invoke government
power on our side of particular disputes.' Yet those develop-
ments are not likely to take place if we assume that equality of
rights for women and for men requires an identity of social func-
tions for women and for men. If the biological learning shows
both differences and similarities in male and female behavior, we
act at our collective peril if we ignore half of its teaching in work-
ing to fashion the social institutions that will surely endure into
the next millennium.
46. For arguments supporting heavy use of government power, see MAcKNmoN, THE-
oRv oF STATE, supra note 2 (arguing that state control is necessary to reverse male domi-
nance); Zillah Eisenstein, Comstructing a Theory of Capital Patriarchy and Social Feminism, in
WOMEN, CLAss AND FEMINIsr MGINATION 114, 114-15, 135-40 (Karen V. Hansen & Ilene
J. Philipson eds., 1990) (arguing that a capitalist class structure and male supremacy are
mutually dependent). See generaly WOMEN AND REVOLunION (Lydia Sargent ed., 1981)
(containing a collection of essays regarding the relationship between Marxism and
feminism).
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